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5.1  Introduction 
Why are land prices in Tokyo so high compared to those in other major 
cities of the world? Many explanations have been given, such as Land Lease 
and Building Lease Laws, low assessments of land under the inheritance tax, 
and the “bubble.” I These are not mutually exclusive explanations, and no doubt 
the accumulated effect of these factors accounts for a good portion of the high 
land prices in Tokyo. 
Yet the most basic factor is often neglected: Tokyo is by far the largest met- 
ropolitan area in the industrialized world. Figure 5.1, which is based on table 
5.1, shows that it is twice as large as the second largest-New  York-in  both 
population and employment.2 
As Mills (1967, 1972) and Muth (1969) pointed out, a city with lower com- 
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1. See Noguchi (ch. 1 in this volume) and Ito (ch. 9 in this volume), for example. 
2. Kobayashi, Komori, and Sugihara (1990) make a detailed comparison of Tokyo, London, and 
Paris, including the comparisons in table 5.1. However, they do not compare these cities against 
New York. Kakumoto (1986, 139-42,  154-56)  conjectures that the population and employment 
sizes of the comparable metropolitan area of Tokyo must be twice as large as that of  New York 
based on the comparison of employment in an area of six hundred square kilometers. Table 5.  I 
verifies Kakumoto’s conjecture and fills the gap in the Kobayashi, Komori, and Sugihara study by 
supplying the New York data for an area of  fourteen thousand square kilometers. 
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Fig. 5.1  Metropolitan areas of the world 
Table 5.1  Metropolitan Areas of the World 
Toyko  New York  London  Paris 
~ 
Area (kmz)  13,495  14,812  15,437  12,012 
Year  1980  1980  1987  1982 
Residents (in thousands)  28,699  16,303  13,152  10,073 
Density (1000/km2)  2.13  1.10  0.85  0.84 
Density (1 ,000/km2)  1  .oo  0.47  0.37  0.41 
Employees (in thousands)  13,515  6,925  5,702  4,933 
Sources: Tokyo: Shutoken Seibi Kyokai 1988,2:10,62,190; New York: U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1986,202, 214-15;  London: British Central Statistical Office (1989); Paris: INSEE (1988). 
Notes:  The metropolitan areas here cover Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama prefectures for 
Tokyo; seven PMSAs listed in table 5.2 for New York; Greater London and the surrounding six 
counties; and the Ile de France. A more detailed comparison among Tokyo, London, and Paris is 
found in Kobayashi, Komori, and Sugihara (1990, 21), though New York is not included in the 
comparison. Kakumoto (1986) compares Tokyo and New York for the areas of six hundred square 
kilometers and less. 
muting cost per kilometer will have a larger population and higher residential 
land prices than another city with the identical labor productivity at its central 
business district (CBD) but with a relatively higher commuting cost per kilo- 
meter. If the population of New York were doubled, keeping the current com- 
muting facilities intact, traffic congestion would become prohibitive. In this 
sense, the availability of  a network of  well-developed  commuter railroads 
keeps the commuting cost in Tokyo lower than in New York. This may be the 89  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
main reason why population size and land price are higher in Tokyo than in 
New York. 
Government intervention also contributes to make the commuting cost in 
Japan artificially low. In fact, Japanese commuters generally pay no commut- 
ing expenses at all; their employers reimburse them. Employers do this because 
the additional wage payment earmarked to cover the commuting expenses is, 
up to a generous limit, not taxable under personal and corporate income taxes. 
Employers can reduce the combined tax payments made by  themselves and 
their employees by reimbursing the commuting fares while reducing the aver- 
age of the regular wage rate. Note that under this scheme the larger the city 
size is, the larger the government subsidy given to the average resident. 
Free commuter riding gives strong incentives to the employees to live farther 
from the city center. This makes the city grow in terms of both geographical 
size and population. Moreover, the free ride makes the population density and 
land price distribution from the CBD flatter than otherwise, as the Mills-Muth 
theory implies. 
The present study has three major aims. First, we  study differences in the 
population and employment distributions of  Tokyo and New York, and exam- 
ine how the different commuting environments of the two areas explain these 
distributions. As the Mills-Muth theory shows, the population density function 
in the residential district of  a city has an intimate relationship with the land 
price function there. The employment density function in the CBD also has a 
close relationship with the land price function there. Although data on land 
prices are not available for New York, population and employment density data 
are available for both Tokyo and New  York. A comparison of the latter will 
shed light on the distribution of land prices in Tokyo. 
Kakumoto (1970, 1986) and Mills and Ohta (1976) compare population 
densities between Tokyo and New York for 1960, 1970, and 1980, respectively. 
In this article, we examine the two metropolitan areas for 1980, but larger and 
more detailed areas than Kakumoto (1986) does. This reveals that even in 1980 
the CBD of Tokyo had much lower employment density than that of New York, 
unlike the implication of Kakumoto’s data. Our data also show that the differ- 
ence in population densities between the two CBDs is more dramatic than 
Kakumoto’s data show. While Mills and Ohta show that the density of manu- 
facturing employment in the CBD of Tokyo is greater than that of New York, 
we reveal the opposite for the total employment. 
Second, we will empirically examine the impact of abolishing the preferen- 
tial tax treatment of free commuter riding upon the land price structure and the 
size of  the Tokyo metropolitan area. Our result shows, for example, that the 
land price at Toyoda, which is fifty-four minutes away from the Tokyo station, 
would be realized in Nishikokubunji, which is forty-seven minutes away from 
the Tokyo station, if  commuters themselves are made to pay  commuter-pass 
fares. To this end, we will first estimate the land price function for Tokyo using 
microdata on residential land price and distance from the Tokyo station. 90  Tatsuo Hatta and Toru Ohkawara 
I 
Fig. 5.2  Prefectures around Tokyo 
Note: A more detailed map of Tokyo prefecture is found in figure 5.10. 
Third, we will evaluate the current urban economic policies in Tokyo regard- 
ing the CBD development and commuter transportation from the viewpoint of 
whether they help attain an efficient resource allocation. It will be shown that 
the various existing policies have consistently made both population and em- 
ployment density distributions flatter than efficiency requires. 
The existing literature on the estimation of the land price function, such as 
Muth  (1969), Mills  (1972),  Kau  and  Sirmans (1979), Mills  and  Hamilton 
(1984), Ohkawara (1985), and Alperovich (1990), assumes that commuters pay 
the monetary expense of commuting. In estimating our land price function for 
Tokyo, we take into account the fact that commuters actually pay commuting 
costs only in terms of time and fatigue. 
Haurin (1983) studies the effects of  the reimbursement of commuting ex- 
penses upon profits of the CBD firms, the population density distribution, and 
efficiency, assuming that the city is closed. When an open city is considered, 
however, entry of new firms bids up the land price until profits are wiped out. 
In the present paper, we examine the effect of the reimbursement on the land 
price as well as on population density, assuming that such competition exists 
at least in the long run. 
Section 5.2 compares the population and employment densities of  Tokyo 
and New York and makes three observations. Section 5.3 presents a simplified 
version of the Mills-Muth model. Section 5.4 explains the observations in the 
theoretical framework of section 5.3. Sections 5.5 through 5.7 empirically esti- 91  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
mate the land price function of Tokyo. Section 5.8 discusses the policy implica- 
tions of our theoretical and empirical observations. A summary of the paper is 
given in section 5.9. 
5.2  Tokyo’s Population and Employment: Facts 
5.2.1  Residential Population 
Table 5.1 compares the residential population in the metropolitan areas of 
Tokyo, New York, London, and Paris. It shows that the residential population 
of the Tokyo metropolitan area, 29 million, is approximately twice as large as 
that of New York, 16 million, and more than twice as large as London or Paris. 
The metropolitan area of Tokyo in this table consists of Tokyo, Kanagawa, 
Chiba, and Saitama prefectures, shown in figure 5.2. For the three other me- 
tropolises, areas of similar geographical size were chosen. In the case of New 
York, for example, the seven most densely populated primary metropolitan 
statistical areas (PMSAs) in the New York-New  Jersey-Connecticut consoli- 
dated metropolitan statistical area (NY-NJ-CT CMSA) are chosen, as listed in 
table 5.2. This area is the NY-NJ-CT CMSA minus Monmouth-Ocean, the NJ 
PMSA and Orange County, and the NY PMSA; the area includes Fairfield, CT, 
Middlesex, NJ, and Hunterdon, NJ, for example. 
The above statistics are apparently in conflict with the obvious observation 
that downtown Tokyo has far fewer skyscrapers than Manhattan. Indeed, figure 
5.3 and table 5.3 show that the population density of the central sixty square 
kilometers in Tokyo is one-half of that in New York. (In this paper, the popula- 
tion density measures the gross density, which is populatiodurban area, rather 
than the net density, which is populatiodresidential  area.) The area of Tokyo 
we chose for this comparison consists of the Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato, and Shin- 
juku wards, the map of which is shown in figure 5.4. The counterpart in New 
York is Manhattan. Table 5.3 shows that the population density of the Chiyoda 
ward is less than one-sixth of a CBD area in Manhattan that has a population 
twice as large the Chiyoda ward. This is also illustrated in figure 5.3. 
Tables 5.4 through 5.6 further break down the population density figures of 
the various areas of the Tokyo metropolitan area in table 5.7. Table 5.8 breaks 
down the figures for the New York metropolitan area. Figure 5.3 is ultimately 
based on these tables. 
Figure 5.3 indicates that the population density of New York is the highest 
near the CBD and declines as the area expands. In Tokyo, on the contrary, 
population density is very low at the central districts and increases as the area 
is expanded up to 240 square kilometers. As a result, Tokyo has a higher popu- 
lation density than New York in an area with the size of Manhattan plus Brook- 
lyn. As the area becomes larger, the gap in the population density grows. Thus 
the population density of  New  York starts out at a high level near the center Table 5.2  PMSAs in the New York Area, 1980 
Area  Population  Employmentb 
Primary Metropolitan  Private  Federal  Local 
Statistical Area  Size  Density  Sector  Govt.  Govt.  Total  Density 
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Source: US.  Bureau of the Census 1986,202,214-15. 
”The seven most densely populated PMSAs in the NY-NJ-CT CMSA. 
bPrivate sector, federal govt., and local govt. stand for private nonfarm, federal government, and state and local government employ- 
ments. Private nonfarm and state and local government employment data are for 1982, while federal government employment data 
are for 1983. 
cFairfield is the CT-New  England County metropolitan area called Bridgeport-Stamford-Nonvalk-Danbury. 
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Fig. 5.3  Population density: Tokyo versus New York 
and drops sharply as the area is expanded, while the density of Tokyo starts 
out at a lower level, increases first, and then declines more slowly than that of 
New York. 
5.2.2  Employment 
Table 5.1 shows 13.5 million people employed in the Tokyo metropolitan 
area while the New York metropolitan area has only 6.9 million (roughly one- 
half of the employment in the Tokyo metropolitan area), and London and Paris 
metropolitan areas have even less. Table 5.7 compares the employment densi- 
ties of Tokyo and New  York  for various area sizes, and figure 5.5 illustrates 
this. Tokyo has twice as many people employed as New York in six hundred 
square kilometers, which is the twenty-three ward district in Tokyo and the 
combined area of Manhattan, Queens, the Bronx, and Brooklyn in New York. 
Moreover, this table shows that Tokyo has more people employed than New 
York  even in a central sixty square kilometers, which is the combined area 
of  Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato, and Shinjuku wards in Tokyo and Manhattan in 
New Y~rk.~ 
Near the  center of the city, however, the opposite is observed. Figure 5.5, 
which is based on table 5.7, illustrates that the combined twenty square kilo- 
meters of Chiyoda and Chuo wards has a smaller population than a comparable 
area of south Manhattan. Moreover, the Chiyoda ward itself has less than three- 
3. Kakumoto (1986, 154-56)  was the first to make comparisons of the two cities with respect 
to areas of sixty and six hundred square kilometers. Table 5.3  Tokyo versus New York: Population Density, 1980 
Tokyo  New York 
Area  Residents  Density  Area  Residents  Density 
(km’)  (I,OWS)  (1  ,OoOs/km2)  (km2)  (1,OoOS)  (l,OoOS/km2) 
Chiyoda war& 
10.4  55 
Four central wards‘ 
58  683 
Fifteen central wardsd 
236  3,889 
All twenty-three wards 
598  8,352 
“Urban area”‘ 
1,232  12,746 
“Urban area” plus 
“suburban area”‘ 
2,292  18,736 
Tokyo metropolitan areag 
8,415  27,348 
Four prefectures’ 
13,495  28,699 
CBD area 
Midtownb 
5.29  3.6  128  35.16 
60 km2 urea 
Manhattan 
11.68  57  1,423  24.96 
240 km2 area 
Manhattan and Brooklyn 
16.48  237  3,659 
600 km2  area 
Manhattan,  Queens,  Bronx, 
13.97  629 
1,200 km2 area 
10.35  1,230 
2,300 km2 area 
8.17  2,240 
8.000 km2 area 
3.25  8,107 
14,000 km2 area 
2.13  14,812 
Brooklyn 
6,719 
Top six counties 
8,479 
Top nine counties 
10,305 
Top fifteen countiesh 
14,642 









Sources: Tokyo: Shutoken Seibi Kyokai 1988, 2:10, 62, 190, 204,205-12;  New York: New York 
City 1988; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1986,202,214-15; CACI 1990,425. 
aThe part of  the Imperial Palace that is closed to the public is excluded from the area figure of 
Chiyoda ward in the first three rows. It is included in the area figures of larger areas of Tokyo, 
since its inclusion hardly affects density figures. 
b“Midtown” is defined as the area bounded by 59th Street, 14th Street, and Lexington Avenue. It 
is District 5 of New York City (1988). 
‘The four central wards are Chiyoda, Chuo, Shinjuku, and Minato. 
dThe fifteen central wards are the first fifteen wards listed in table 5.4 
e“Urban area” (Kisei Shigaichi) is defined by  the Tokyo Metropolitan Area Refurbishment Act. 
(Shotoken Seibi Ho) and consists of the twenty-three wards of Tokyo Musashino, and Mitaka, 
Kawasaki, Kawaguchi, and Yokohama except for Seya ward. 
‘Table 5.6 lists the thirty-eight suburban cities of Tokyo in the “suburban area” (Kink0  Seibi Chitai) 
as defined by the law. 
@‘Tokyo  metropolitan area” (Tokyo Daitoshi Chiiki) combines the ”urban area” and “suburban 
area” defined above. 
hThe  fifteen counties in the New York area with the highest population densities are listed in table 
5.8 in order of density. 
‘Tokyo,  Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama prefectures. 
’The seven SMSAs in the New York area with the highest population density are listed in table 5.2. 95  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
Fig. 5.4 
Notes: Wards are listed in the order of the density of  population during the day, as in tables 5.4 
and 5.9. Figure 5.10 locates the ward district of Tokyo within Tokyo prefecture. 
fourths of the number of employees that New York has, with roughly the same 
area.4 A detailed breakdown of  population densities is given in table 5.9  for 
the ward district of Tokyo, and in table 5.10 for south Manhattan. 
5.2.3  Summary Observations 
Our observations may be summarized as follows: 
1. Population  and  employment  sizes  of  the  entire  metropolitan  area  of 
Tokyo are twice as large as those of New York. 
2.  The CBD of Tokyo is underutilized relative to the CBD of New York. 
The employment density of the CBD of Tokyo is less than three-fourths of the 
corresponding  area in New  York,  while population  density of  the  CBD of 
Tokyo is less than one-sixth of that of New York. 
3. The population density curve is flatter in the Tokyo suburbs than in the 
New  York  suburbs.  (As the  area  size increases,  the population  density  in- 
creases first and then  declines in Tokyo, while it monotonically  declines in 
New York.) The employment density curve is flatter in Tokyo than in New 
York in all area sizes. 
4. The Tokyo figure includes government as well as private-sector employees, but the New York 
figure does not include employees of  federal or local governments. Thus the actual employment 
density of New York is even higher than the figure given in table 5.7. Table 5.4  The Twenty-three Wards of Tokyo: Population, 1980 
Cumulative 
(1 ,OOoS/km*)  Ward  (km2)  (1,ooos)  ( 1  ,ooosflun2)  (km2)  (1,ooos)  (  1  ,OOoSikm*) 
Day Population  Residential  Cumulative  Cumulative 





























































































































































































Souce; Shutoken Seibi Kyokai 1988, 2:204, 205. 
‘The density of  population during the day, which includes employees, students, and residents who are in the ward during the daytime. 
bThe  area of Chiyoda ward is 11.52 kmz.  The part of the Imperial Palace that is closed to the public is 1.13 km2.  The area listed here is what is open to 
the public. 
‘The  last row gives the total area of  the ward district including the Imperial Palace. The total population figure is corrected for rounding error. The 
impact of these corrections upon the total population density is negligible. 97  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
Table 5.5  Cities in the Urban Area of Tokyo: Population, 1980 
City 
Density 
(I  ,OOOs/kmL) 
23 wards of  Tokyo  598  8,352 
Musashino  11  137 
Mitaka  17  I65 
Kawasaki  136  1,041 
Kawaguchi  56  379 
Yokohama  414  2,673 








Source:  Shutoken Seibi Kyokai 1988,2:205-12. 
Note: “Urban area” is defined in the notes to table 5.3. 
5.3  A Theory of Commuting Costs, Land Prices, and 
Population Densities 
As a preparation to explaining the reasons for the above differences between 
Tokyo and New York in section 5.4,  we now discuss the relevant aspects of the 
Mills-Muth model of an urban economy. 
5.3.1  Commuting Cost and Metropolitan Size 
The fundamental reason why megalopolises like Tokyo and New York exist 
is the agglomeration economies in production, that is, the benefits that firms 
can obtain from each other when they are located in the same city. When a firm 
is located in the CBD of a large city, costs of communication with other firms 
in the city are reduced both in terms of  face-to-face and telephone contacts. 
Besides, a firm in a large city can enjoy business support services, such as 
computer maintenance, elevator maintenance, office cleaning, and business 
consulting. Moreover, public facilities such as communication and transporta- 
tion facilities are subject to considerable scale economies. Thus new firms are 
attracted to a large city.  These newcomers to the city further emit external 
economies to other firms in the same city, and encourage even more firms to 
move into the city. 
This virtuous cycle of agglomeration economies increases the productivity 
of the firms at the CBD, enabling them to pay much higher wage rates than the 
rural firms. This wage-rate difference attracts workers from the rural area to 
the city. 
But the immigration will not continue indefinitely. The urban workers have 
to pay commuting costs, which consist of train fares, auto expenses, time, and 
fatigue. We  will call the CBD wage rate minus the monetary equivalent of the 
commuting cost at a given location the net urban wage rate at the location. It 
declines as the distance between the CBD and the location increases. At  a 
location too far from the CBD, the net urban wage rate would become lower 
than the rural wage rate. 98  Tatsuo Hatta and Toru Ohkawara 
Table 5.6  Cities in the Suburban Area of Tokyo: Population, 1980 
City 
Area  Population  Density 





































































































































































Source: Shutoken Seigi Kyokai 1988, 2:205-12. 
Note: These are the thirty-eight most densely populated cities within the “suburban area” (Kink0 
Seihi Chitai) as defined by  the Act on Suburban Development in  the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
(Shutoken no Kinkou Seibi Chitai oyobi Toshi Kaihatsu Kuiki no Seibi ni K~~SUN  Horitsu). 
““Urban  area” is defined in table 5.3. 99  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
Table 5.7  Tokyo versus New York: Employment Density 






Employment  Density  Area  Employment  Density 
(  1  ,OoOs)  (  1,ooOSflun2)  (km2)  (  ~,OoOs)  (1,Ooosh') 
Chiyoda ward' 
768 
Two central wards 
1,386 
Four central wards 
2,406 
All twenty-three wards 
598  6.234 
Four prefectures 
13,495  13,515 
11 km2 and less 
Midtown amd Downtownb 
(a) 5.34  760  142.4 
73.9  (b) 10.99  11,961  108.4 
20 km2 area 
South Manhattan" 
69.3  21.48  1,609  74.9 
60 km2 area 
Manhattan 
40.8  57  1,949  34.2 
600 km2 area 
Manhattan, Queens, 
Bronx, and Brooklyn 
10.4  629  3,223  5.1 
14,000 kmz  area 
Top seven PMSAs 
1  .o  14,812  6,925  .05 
Sources: Tokyo: Shutoken Seibi Kyokai  1988, 2:62,  204,  205; New  York: U.S. Bureau of  the 
Census 1986,202,214-15;  CACI 1990,425. 
Nofes:  Data for Midtown, Downtown, and South Manhattan are for 1987 and include only private- 
sector employment. All other data are for  1980 and include both private-sector and government 
employment. 
'The  part of the Imperial Palace that is closed to the public is excluded from the area figure of 
Chiyoda ward. 
bMidtown and Downtown of Manhattan (a) is the first eight zip code areas in table 5.10,  while (b) 
is the first ten zip code ares of the same table. 
'South Manhattan is defined to be the area consisting of the first eighteen zip code areas in table 
5.10. See notes to table 5.3 for the definitions of other areas. 
Assume that people are homogeneous and free migration takes place be- 
tween the city and the rural area. Then a resident at a border between the met- 
ropolitan area and the rural area should be indifferent between commuting to 
the CBD and working in the rural area. If we assume that the rural workers pay 
zero commuting costs, the net urban wage rate at the border must be equal to 
the rural wage rate. 
Figure 5.6(a) illustrates the determination of the boundary of the metropoli- 
tan area. The rural wage rate, I%,  and the CBD wage rate, wo,  are marked on 
the vertical axis. The net urban wage rate at each location is depicted by  the 
thick line, under the assumption that the commuting cost is proportional to the 
distance from  the  CBD. The  metropolitan area  ends at  a  distance where 100  Tatsuo Hatta and Tom Ohkawara 
100- 
- 











Table 5.8  Counties in the New York Area: Population, 1980 
Population  Population  Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative 
County  (mi’)  (km2)  (1 ,OOOs)  (1  .O0Osh2)  (h2)  (1 ,OOOs)  (  1  ,OOOs/km*) 

























































































































Source: U.S.  Bureau of the Census 1986,202. 
Note: Listed are the fifteen most densely populated counties in the NY-NJ-CT CMSA. The sixteenth 
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Fig. 5.5  Employment density: Tokyo versus New York 101  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
Table 5.9 
Day 
Population  Cumulative  Cumulative 
Density”  Area  Emp.6  Density  Cumulative  Employees  Density 
(1  ,OOOs/km*)  Ward  (kd) (1  ,OOOs)  (  l,OOOshz)  Area (km2)  (1  ,OOOs)  (1  ,000sh2) 

























Chiyo&  10.39 
Chuo  10.05 
Shinjuku  18.04 
Minato  19.99 
Taito  10.00 
Shibuya  15.11 
Bunkyo  11.44 
Toshima  13.01 
Sumida  13.82 
Arakawa  10.34 
Shinagawa  20.91 
Meguro  14.41 
Nakano  15.73 
Kita  20.55 
Itabashi  31.90 
Ohta  49.42 
Suginami  33.54 
Setagaya  58.81 
Katsushika  33.90 
Adachi  53.25 
Koto  36.89 
Nerima  47.00 









































































767  73.8 
1,386  67.8 
1,832  47.6 
2,406  41.1 
2,663  38.9 
2,948  35.3 
3,115  32.8 
3,320  30.7 
3,493  28.7 
3,605  27.3 
3,847  25.1 
3,977  23.7 
4,092  22.3 
4,25 1  20.9 
4,474  19.0 
4,834  17.0 
4,995  15.7 
5,236  13.9 
5,413  13.2 
5,659  12.2 
5,870  11.7 
6,042  11.0 
6,235  10.4 
Source: Shutoken Seibi Kyokai 1988,2:204,205. 
“The density of  population during the daytime, which includes employees, students, and residents who 
are in the ward. 
“Emp. stands for the number of employees. 
‘See note b, table 5.4. 
the thick line reaches the level of the rural wage rate. The distance between the 
CBD and a border is represented by X  on the horizontal axis. 
The figure makes it clear that the commuting cost at the border reflects the 
labor productivity difference between the CBD and the rural area. If the CBD 
productivity is increased, the thick line in figure 5.6(a) will shift right, and the 
city size will increase both geographically and demographically. If  the trans- 
portation cost is reduced, the thick line in figure 5.6(a) will become flatter and 
X will increase. This of course implies that, if the transportation cost of  a city 
is cheaper in one city than in another city with an identical CBD productivity, 
the geographic and demographic sizes of  the former city will be greater than 
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Table 5.10  South Manhattan: Employment, 1987 
Cumulative  Cumulative 
Zip  Area  Employee  Density  Cumulative  Employee  Density 
























0.09  41.5 
0.26  71.9 
0.12  33.7 
1.18  195.1 
0.28  39.4 
1.62  183.6 
0.67  73.0 
1.13  122.4 
1.20  110.4 
I .63  123.1 
0.92  65.1 
1.91  132.2 
2.35  145.2 
1.08  63.3 
0.92  33.4 
1.84  63.4 
2.09  57.8 
2.21  54.6 
1.24  21.9 
I .96  22.6 
2.51  20.1 
1.69  10.2 


























































































Sources: CACI 1990, 425, for the employment figures. Rehana Siddiqui of Columbia University com- 
puted the area of  each zip code district from a Manhattan map. 
Nore: The employment figures are for the private sector only. 
"Zip code 10020 is Rockefeller Center, 10005 is Wall St., and 10047-48  are the twin towers of  the World 
Trade Center. 
5.3.2  Land Prices and Population Density 
Due to the assumption of free migration, a person must be indifferent be- 
tween living at any location in the city and living in the rural area at an equilib- 
rium. Suppose that a worker living close to the CBD enjoyed a higher living 
standard than a border worker. Then all of the rural residents would want to 
migrate near the CBD. Hence the housing rent near the CBD would go up until 
the living standard of the residents there became exactly equal to the living 
standard at the rural area. 
The thick line in figure 5.6(b) represents the housing rent curve, which is 
derived from the net urban wage rate curve depicted in figure 5.6(a). When 
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Fig. 5.6  The rent curves 
tion, the population density increases as the location becomes closer to the city 
center, and hence the housing rent curve is convex to the t rig in.^ 
5. If the demand for housing floor space were fixed regardless of the level of rent, the housing 
rent curve would be linear. In fact, if we choose the unit of housing services so that each consumer 
consumes one unit of housing floor space, r -  T-  = w -  iii will hold at each location within the 
city. If housing floor space and nonhousing consumption are substitutable, however, the rent curve 
becomes convex to the origin. Suppose that the rent curve is linear in such a way that it just enables 
a resident at an interior location to purchase the same combination of floor space and nonhousing 
consumption as a border resident, guaranteeing at least the utility level of a border resident. If an 
interior resident chose this option, he would not be maximizing his utility under the given expendi- 
ture; he would be able to improve his utility by  reducing the consumption of the floor space and 
increasing that of the nonhousing consumption goods. This is because he faces a higher relative 
price of the floor space than a border resident does. Thus the utility-compensating rent has to be 
higher than the rent that just enables this resident to buy the same bundle as the border resident. 
We  can similarly compare this resident and the third resident living even closer to the center, 
showing that the rent for the third resident again has to be higher than a linear rent curve based on 
the second resident’s consumption bundle. When nonhousing consumption is substitutable for 
housing floor space, therefore, the housing rent curve must be convex to the origin. 104  Tatsuo Hatta and Toru Ohkawara 
If  land and capital are substitutable in housing production, moreover, the 
increase in the housing rent will encourage construction of high-rise buildings, 
and the floor space per square kilometer of  land will expand near the CBD. 
The land rent curve then becomes more curved toward the origin in comparison 
to the housing rent curve.6 Thus the shape of the housing rent curve and the 
factor substitutability in the housing industry determines the curvature of the 
land rent curve, as depicted in figure 5.6(c). 
If either the utility function or the production function or both are substitut- 
able, the land space per resident becomes smaller, that is, the population den- 
sity increases for locations closer to the CBD. The reasoning above suggests 
that this causes the land rent function to be curved to the origin. We  might 
conclude, therefore, that the steeper the population density curve, the steeper 
the land rent curve.’ Indeed, we will show in equation (8) that the land rent 
curve and the population density curve are proportional in the economy with 
Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions when the commuting cost con- 
sists of only time and fatigue. 
The land price curve is vertically proportional to the land rent curve if  the 
land price is equal to the present value of the future land rent and if a propor- 
tional future increase in the land rent is expected regardless of the location. 
The equality between the land price and the present value of the rent income 
stream does not hold if  “bubbles” prevent the fundamentals from being re- 
flected in the land prices. But so long as the bubble effect is proportional to 
the present value of the future land rent stream regardless of the location in the 
city, we may still view the land price curve to be vertically proportional to the 
land rent curve. 
These observations yield the following proposition regarding the effect of a 
change in the commuting cost upon the land price curve and the population 
density curve. 
Proposition  I. Suppose that the commuting cost per kilometer is reduced, 
keeping the  CBD productivity constant. Then the following hold:  (1) the 
y-axis intercept of  the land price curve remains the same. However, the slope 
of the land price curve becomes flatter, and the level of X increases. (2)  The 
y-axis intercept of the population density curve remains the same, but the slope 
of the population density curve becomes flatter. 
6. If a fixed amount of  land is necessary to produce a given floor space, the housing rent differ- 
ence between two locations will be proportional to the land rent difference. If land and capital 
are substitutable, the land rent difference will grow more than proportionally as the housing rent 
difference grows. The reason is similar to the one given for the convexity of the housing rent curve. 
7. If housing and other consumptions are not substitutable in the utility function and if capital 
and land are not substitutable in the production function, population density at any location of the 
city should be equal to that in the rural area. The above argument suggests, moreover, that the land 
rent function should be linear in that case. 105  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
5.3.3  Agglomeration Economies 
It was pointed out in  section 5.3.1 that agglomeration economies are the 
source of the high labor productivity at the CBD in large metropolitan areas. 
In the present section, however, we  have so far implicitly assumed that the 
labor productivity at the CBD is kept constant while the per-kilometer com- 
muting cost is changed. Since a change in commuting cost implies a change in 
the urban population size, this amounts to implicitly assuming that the agglom- 
eration economies are already exhausted at the CBD, and the production func- 
tion obeys constant returns to scale at a high level of efficiency. 
This artificial separation between the urban population size and the CBD 
productivity is conceptually convenient. But proposition 1 can be easily modi- 
fied to the situation where an increase in the employment size at the CBD still 
causes agglomeration economies. We will assume external economies of scale. 
Thus each firm perceives its production function to be constant returns to scale, 
but the production in the CBD as a whole obeys increasing returns to scale. 
Then we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2. Suppose that the commuting cost per kilometer is reduced in an 
economy where the CBD technology is subject to external economies of scale. 
Then the following hold: (1) The y-axis intercept of the land price curve in- 
creases, the slope of the land price curve becomes flatter for each land price, 
and the level of  increases. (2) The y-axis intercept of the population density 
curve increases, and the slope of the population density curve becomes flatter 
for each density level. 
Roughly speaking, the effect of changing the per-kilometer transportation 
cost is magnified when the CBD technology is subject to external economies 
of scale. 
5.3.4  Idiosyncratic Consumers 
In deriving the above propositions, we assumed that all consumers are alike. 
But the existence of a relatively small number of idiosyncratic consumers does 
not affect the shapes of the land price and population density curves. 
Suppose, for example, that there is a group of  talented persons who get 
higher wages at the CBD than other workers, even though they earn the same 
wages as others if they work in the rural area. Their reservation land price at 
an urban location, that is, the one that would make them feel indifferent about 
the choice between that location and the border, will be higher than the reserva- 
tion land price for the homogeneous consumers. If there is a sufficiently small 
number of these talented people, however, the amount of land demanded of a 
given location at their reservation land price will be below the amount sup- 
plied. In this case, the talented people will not be the marginal buyers of land; 106  Tatsuo Hatta and Toru Ohkawara 
the market clearing price will be the one obtained from the homogeneous con- 
sumers.8 
5.3.5  Business Land Use 
So far we have implicitly  assumed  that the  CBD firms use  a  minuscule 
amount of land. Obviously this is not the case in reality. Suppose that the CBD 
production uses land, capital, and labor. Also assume that the productivity de- 
creases as a firm is located farther from the city center. Then the line AC in 
figure 5.7(a) depicts the business land price curve that shows the land prices 
for various locations under which business firms would be indifferent in their 
locational choice. If the business firms demand large enough amounts of land 
in the CBD district to become the marginal buyers, they will outbid the demand 
for residential use; consequently, the business land prices become the market 
prices, and the line ABD will become the market price line. 
The commuters working in the AB region may first go to the city center by 
train and then reach their workplace from the city center through other trans- 
portation modes. In that case, the firms must compensate the additional trip 
cost from the city center to the workplaces, and it will be a cause of the reduced 
productivity of the firms represented by the declining AB curve. 
Some workplaces near B may be less expensive for commuters to reach di- 
rectly without detouring through the city center. If these commuters received 
the same wage rate as the workers at the center, they would be better off than 
the workers  at the center, which would entice more people to work near B. 
This would drive down the wage rate near B until it became equal to the loca- 
tion’s net urban wage rate for the workers at the center. 
Some grocery shops may find it more profitable  to be located at S in the 
middle  of  the  suburbs rather  than  near  the  CBD. Their  demand  curve for 
the land at S is downward sloping. For the CBD commuters, on the other hand, 
the land  at S and any other suburban location is a perfect  substitute. Their 
demand curve for the land at S is horizontal at the level of the land price given 
by  figure 5.7(a). The combined demand curve of the grocery shops and the 
commuters for the land at this location is downward sloping at first and be- 
comes flat at the demand price level of  the CBD commuters. If the vertical 
supply curve of this land intersects with the combined demand curve at the flat 
portion, we say the CBD commuters are the “marginal land buyers” and the 
grocery shop owners “inframarginal land buyers.” If the grocery shops are not 
marginal land buyers, they will not affect the market land prices. 
8. As another example, suppose that there is one deviant person in this economy who hardly 
minds commuting up to twenty minutes but dislikes the additional commuting more intensely than 
others. Then the price curve that would make him indifferent about the choice of residential loca- 
tion is relatively flat at a high level near the CBD up to a location with the twenty-minute commut- 
ing distance and then precipitously declines. At the location within twenty minutes of the CBD, 
he is thus willing to pay more for the land than others. But to the extent he is a minority, he will 
not be the marginal buyer, and his taste will not affect the land prices. 107  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
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Fig. 5.7  Land price curves 
If a shopping center in a suburb is large enough to be a local marginal land 
buyer, however, it will outbid the residents, and the land price curve will be- 
come like figure 5.7(b). Workers commuting to these suburban workplaces will 
bid down their wage rates at the center. 
These observations suggest that, when small workplaces are spread all over 
the metropolitan area, workers commute from suburbs farther away from the 
CBD to non-CBD workplaces, but they do not affect the shape of the market 
land price curve for the residential districts. Figure 5.7(b) suggests that, even 
if  a major shopping center exists, it will not necessarily affect the residential 
land prices in the area away from the CBD and the shopping center. 
5.3.6  Summary 
In the present section, we have shown that, in a Mills-Muth model of a con- 
centric city, a reduction in transportation costs makes a city larger both geo- 
graphically and demographically, while it makes the land price and population 
density curves flatter. We have also demonstrated that the land price and popu- 
lation density curves will stay the same even if  the assumptions of  homoge- 
neous consumers and concentration of employment at the city center are vio- 
lated to some extent. 108  Tatsuo Hatta and Toru Ohkawara 
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Fig. 5.8  Modes of transportation for commuting 
5.4  Tokyo’s Population and Employment: An Explanation 
We  are now  in a position to explain the three major differences between 
Tokyo and New York in structural characteristics, using the theoretical frame- 
work outlined above. 
5.4.1 
Dependence on the Railroad System 
We  have seen in the previous section that the higher the productivity at the 
CBD is and the lower the cost of commuting is, the larger is the city size. Since 
the major source of the high productivity at their CBD of Tokyo or New York 
is the agglomeration economies, the size of the CBD employment itself affects 
the productivity of the city. Thus commuting cost must be the major indepen- 
dent factor that determines the difference in the sizes of New York and Tokyo. 
Figure 5.8, which is based on table 5.11, indicates that 59 percent of the 
commuters to Manhattan and 88 percent of the commuters to the four central 
wards of Tokyo use the railroad. Table 5.11 shows that 93 percent of the com- 
muters to the Chiyoda ward use the railroad for commuting. 
Passenger cars play a negligible role in commuting to the CBD of Tokyo. In 
1980, only 5 percent of the commuters to the four central wards of Tokyo used 
passenger cars and taxis. On the other hand, 18 percent used passenger cars 
and taxis to commute to Manhattan. Moreover, many railroad commuters to 
Manhattan use passenger cars from home to railroad stations, while Tokyo 
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Table 5.11  Mode of Wansportation for Commuting, 1980 (%) 
Tokyo“ 
Mode of Transportation  Chiyoda  4 Wardsb  Manhattan‘ 
(a) Train and subwayd 
(c) Taxi 
(d) Bus 
(e) Bicycle and motorcycle 
(f) Walk 
(g) Other meansc 
(b) Car 
Total commuters (1  ,OOOs) 
93.0 
3.2 






















Sources: New York Barry 1985; Tokyo: Japanese Agency of  General Affairs 1985. 
“Tokyo figures include those who commute to attend schools as well as those who commute to 
work. The figures for b throughfrepresent those who use the respective mode only. 
The  four wards are Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato, and Shinjuku. 
The  New York figures represent only those who commute to work in Manhattan. The figures 
represent the percentage of  those who use the respective mode for the most distance. The only 
exception is mode e. 
dIncludes Tokyo commuters who use train or subway in conjunction iwth another mode. A com- 
muter who uses three or more modes is also classified in this category, since the original data do 
not decompose this category. Those who use three or more modes are 8.8 percent of the total in 
both four wards and Chiyoda. 
“‘Other means” for Tokyo represents a combination of two means among 6-e.  “Other means” for 
New York represents a mode other than a-ffor  the most distance. 
railroad commuters walk, bicycle, or take the bus to railroad stations. Com- 
pared with New  York  commuters, therefore, Tokyo commuters rely less on 
passenger cars and more on railroads. 
Table 5.12 shows that subways carry twice as many passengers in Tokyo as 
in New York. Moreover, suburban commuter trains play a even more important 
role than subways in Tokyo, while the opposite is the case in New York. The 
subway system carries only 21  percent of  the railroad passengers in Tokyo, 
while it carries 83 percent of them in New York. 
Indeed, the Tokyo railroad system carries at least five times as many com- 
muters as the New York system. In 1980, the total number of passengers with 
commuting passes was 7.1 billion for the railroad system in the Tokyo com- 
muting area as defined by Unyu Keizei Kenkyu Center. In the same year, the 
total number of commuters (to work) was 1.4 billion for the railroad system in 
the Tri-State region as defined by  the Tri-State Regional Planning Commis- 
 ion.^ The Tri-State region has an area of more than twice the size of the Tokyo 
commuting area. 
9. The size of Tokyo commuting area is 6,400 square kilometers and is smaller than the Tokyo 
metropolitan area defined in table 5.3. Its population was 25.804 million. In 1980, the total number 
of passengers with commuting passes in this area per year was 7,117 million for the entire railroad 
system, while it was 1,486 million for subways. See Unyu Keizai Kenkyu Center (1989, 108-9). 110  Tatsuo Hatta and Toru Ohkawara 
Table 5.12  International Comparison of Subway Networks 
~~ 
Annual 
Annual  Kilometers of  Number of  Average 
Volume of  Services  Kilometers  Passengers 
Passengers  Provided  Served  per Operating 
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Source: Union Internationale de Transport Publique 1983. 
If the population of New York were doubled, keeping the current commut- 
ing facilities intact, traffic congestion would become prohibitive. In this sense, 
the availability of a network of well-developed commuter railroads keeps the 
commuting cost in Tokyo lower than in New York. This may be the main rea- 
son why population size is higher in Tokyo than in New York. 
Demand and Supply for the Railroad Systems 
In Tokyo, a higher railroad-to-automobile  ratio than  in New  York  is de- 
manded for commuting for two reasons. 
First, the commuter train service runs more frequently in Tokyo than in New 
York, making a train ride more attractive to commuters in Tokyo than those in 
New York. For example, a Chuo Line train for Tokyo station stops at Mitaka 
every two minutes during the rush hour, but a New Haven Line train for Grand 
Central Station stops at Larchmont  every twenty  minutes; both Mitaka  and 
Larchmont are thirty minutes away from the respective terminal stations. 
Second, commuting cost from home to the nearby suburban train station is 
cheaper in Tokyo than in New York. Frequent and inexpensive bus service is 
available to most suburban train  stations in Tokyo, while driving passenger 
cars is often necessary to reach suburban train stations in the New York area. 
Suburban communities in Tokyo were developed in such a way  that the resi- 
dents can walk, ride a bicycle, or take a bus to railroad stations, because sub- 
urbs were developed before motorization. The resulting high population den- 
The Tri-State region is an area greater than the top seven PMSAs defined in table 5.3. In 1980, 
the total number of people commuting to work in this region was 1.443  million, while it was 1.150 
million for subways. See Barry (1985, 17,  19). 111  Housing and the Journey to Work  in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
sity in suburbs makes frequent bus service to the train station possible. In the 
New York  area, where many  suburbs were developed  after motorization,  it 
was taken for granted that most commuters drive cars to the suburban railroad 
stations. Hence suburban communities with low population densities emerged. 
As a result, relatively few people live within walking distance of a suburban 
train  station,  and bus  service to many  suburban  train  stations is not  even 
available. 
On the supply side, the railroad services in Tokyo are widespread and fre- 
quent for two reasons. 
First, a higher level of fixed investment was made in the train system than 
in the highway system during the period when Tokyo was suburbanized. This is 
because the suburbanization of Tokyo took place before passenger cars became 
affordable to most residents. 
Second, the high population density in the Tokyo area makes frequent com- 
muter services profitable. Except for interest subsidies for certain types of in- 
vestments, commuter train firms in Tokyo operate in the black without govern- 
ment subsidies.I0  This makes them remarkably different from their American 
and European counterparts. 
An examination of demand and supply factors above implies that agglomer- 
ation economies exist in the production of mass transit services. Scale econo- 
mies can always give rise to multiple equilibria. Once the density exceeds a 
critical level, an equilibrium in a metropolitan area is reached with high popu- 
lation density and with a profitable mass transit system. But if the critical level 
is not attained, a different equilibrium is reached, with a low density requiring 
passenger cm  as a mode of commuting. It appears that the historical accident 
helped Tokyo reach the level of suburban density above the “critical level.” 
5.4.2  Underutilization of the CBD 
Employment 
The Tokyo metropolitan area has a population size twice as large as that of 
the New York  metropolitan  area, owing partly to a better-developed  transit 
system. Thus it would be only natural if  the CBD of Tokyo should have a 
higher employment density than that of New York. 
In reality, the employment density of Tokyo is lower than that of New York; 
the space of the CBD area of Tokyo is considerably underutilized relative to 
that of New York. Three historical and institutional factors explain this phe- 
nomenon. 
The first factor is the building code used to restrict the height of buildings 
in Japan until  1970, when advancement in aseismic construction technology 
made the restriction unnecessary. In the area with convenient traffic access, 
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Fig. 5.9  Employment trend, central wards in Tokyo 
low-level buildings had been constructed by  the time the restriction was re- 
moved. 
Second, Land Lease and Building Lease Laws have prevented conversions 
of one- and two-story residential housing into skyscrapers." 
Third, other restrictions on building size such as the Sunshine Law make 
construction of skyscrapers more expensive. 
Owing to these historical and institutional frictions, therefore, Tokyo is out 
of equilibrium with respect to its CBD employment density. It appears, how- 
ever, that the CBD in Tokyo is in the adjustment process and is moving toward 
an equilibrium with a high employment density. Evidence for this is that the 
employment in  the Tokyo CBD has been rapidly expanding relative to the 
larger business districts, as figure 5.9 and table 5.13 indicate. 
Besides, the market seems to realize that the CBD in Tokyo is in an adjust- 
ment phase. Noguchi (ch. 1 in this volume) points out that the land price in 
Tokyo is much higher than the present value of the future office rent stream if 
the rent is assumed to increase in proportion to GNP. When the potentially 
high employment density is realized in the future by  overcoming the above 
frictions, a square kilometer of land in the CBD will be able to command a 
much higher land rent than now. In a competitive economy, such future produc- 
tivity increases in land must be already capitalized in the present land price. 
Noguchi's  observation seems to imply that the market expects such a rapid 
increase in the land productivity at the CBD. 
11. See Noguchi (ch. 1 in this volume) and Ito (ch. 9 in this volume) for details. 113  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
Table 5.13  Dynamics of Employment in the CBD of Tokyo (in thousands) 
Growth Rate 
1965-85 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  (%) 
Chiyoda  610  673 
Chuo  565  587 
Minato  398  461 
Shinjuku  300  351 






745  767 
62  1  619 
537  574 
400  446 
6,118  6,234 
10.7%  3.0% 
5.8%  -0.3% 
16.5%  6.9% 
14.0%  11.5% 
3.9%  1.9% 
850  39.3 
658  16.5 
694  74.4 
512  70.7 






Note: The percentage under each employment figure gives the growth rate of  employment in the 
preceding five years. 
Sources: Japanese Agency of  General Affairs 1986; Shutoken Seibi Kyokai 1988. 
Moreover, the market seems to expect Tokyo to have an even higher CBD 
land rent than New  York. Currently, we observe a higher CBD land price in 
Tokyo than in New York despite a lower employment density. It is certainly 
possible to explain a part of this gap in terms of the “bubble,” as Noguchi does. 
But the gap is also consistent with the hypothesis that  the market expects 
Tokyo to have a higher employment density in the CBD than New York will, 
to match Tokyo’s larger population and employment in the entire metropolitan 
area. Suppose that the equilibrium is restored and the CBD of Tokyo attains a 
higher employment density than that of New York. Then agglomeration econo- 
mies would enable Tokyo to have a higher labor productivity, and hence higher 
rents and land prices, than New York. The gap in the CBD land prices of the 
two cities is consistent with such a business expectation. 
Residential Population 
The population density of the CBD is also lower in Tokyo than in New York. 
But Tokyo’s low CBD density does not require special explanations; the busi- 
ness sector can outbid the household sector for the CBD land use in any city 
in any country. Moreover, the three explanations for the low employment den- 
sity in the CBD of Tokyo account for the low population density. 
It is the high density in the CBD of New York that requires a special expla- 
nation, although we will not venture into this topic here except to note that 
strict zoning in New York protects residential areas in the middle of its CBD. 
5.4.3  Flat Population Density Curve 
Figure 5.3 shows that the population density curve for the suburbs of Tokyo 
is flatter than the curve for New York. One possible explanation may lie in the 114  Tatsuo Hatta and Tom Ohkawara 
fact that the commuter trains in Tokyo maintain fast, accurate, and frequent 
services, which keep the per-kilometer cost of travel in Tokyo low. 
In addition, employers’ reimbursements of commuting expenses help keep 
the per-kilometer  cost of travel low. Indeed, among those who bought com- 
muter passes for the railroad in major metropolitan  areas of  Japan in  1985, 
only 5 percent paid the full amount of the commuting passes by themselves.I2 
Employers reimburse commuting expenses because the additional wage pay- 
ment  earmarked to  cover the  commuting  expenses, up  to 50,000 yen  per 
month, is not taxable under the personal income tax. This preferential tax treat- 
ment encourages employers to shift a portion of the initial total wage payment 
to the reimbursement of commuting expenses.I3 
Free commuter riding gives strong incentives to employees to live farther 
from the city center than otherwise. This flattens the population density and 
land price distribution from the CBD. Moreover, the free ride makes the city 
grow in terms of both geographical size and population. In 1985, the average 
commuter working  in Chiyoda, Chuo, and Minato wards spent sixty-seven 
minutes in commuting one way, according to the Ministry of Transportation 
(1985). 
5.5  The Land Price Function: The Model 
In sections 5.5-5.7  we will expound on the impact of the reimbursement of 
commuting expenses by  estimating the residential land price functions with 
and without reimbursement. 
The basic idea for the estimation is simple. Tokyo commuters pay no mone- 
tary expenses for commuting. Hence the nonmonetary costs of commuting, 
time and fatigue, are the only reason why the land prices in Tokyo fall as the 
distance of a location from the CBD increases. Thus the observed land price 
distribution will reveal the nonmonetary costs of commuting, and we should 
be able to estimate the parameters of the utility function and the housing pro- 
duction function from the land price distribution. Once these parameters are 
estimated, we can derive the land price equation that would prevail when com- 
muters have to pay their monetary commuting expenses as well. 
The model we use is a formal version of the model developed in section 5.3. 
The readers not interested in technicalities may want to skip to section 5.7.3. 
12. According to the Japanese Ministry of Transportation (1987,  164). 94.9 percent of  those 
who bought commuter passes for the railroad in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya metropolitan areas in 
1985 received some reimbursement from their employers, 93.4 percent were reimbursed more 
than one-half of the purchase amount, and 86.5 percent received full reimbursement. 
13. Suppose a firm  decides to reimburse its employees’ commuting expenses by  appropriating 
a portion of  the initial total wage payment. This action will reduce its employees’ aggregate in- 
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5.5.1  The Demand Price Equation 
units of composite consumption good, and 4 minutes of leisure. Let 
Consider a household that consumes h square meters of housing services, z 
u(h,  z,  e)  =  hWW 
represent its utility  function. Suppose that  the hours of  work  is fixed. Let 
6 represent leisure endowment minus the sum of the time for work and the 
time required for minimum subsistence such as sleeping and eating. Then the 
leisure time 4 is obtained by  subtracting the commuting time from 6. Assume 
that the household is at a point with the commuting distance of x  minutes from 
the CBD (hereafter we will refer to it simply as a point with distance x). Then 
we have 4 = 6 -  x. We  define the reduced utility function U by  substituting 
this for 4 in the function u to get 
(1)  U(h,  z, x) = hPz'-P(S -  x)". 
We assume that the household located at a point with distance x  maximizes 
its utility level under the following budget constraint: 
(2)  r(x)h + z = Y -  tx, 
where r(x) is the housing rent at distance x, Y is income, and t is the per- 
kilometer fare for commuting that the commuter has to pay.  The unit of the 
compound good is so chosen as to make its unit price equal to one. 
A consumer living at distance x  will maximize the value of (1) subject to (2) 
by choosing h and z for the given  t, x, and r(x).  The maximum utility level 
that the household attains under the budget constraint is given by the indirect 
utility function vo(r(x),  Y -  tx,  x). 
It is assumed that the rural residents do not have to commute to work, and 
their utility level is 8. Since we assume that the household can freely migrate 
between the metropolitan area and the rural area seeking a higher utility level, 
the utility level of a household living in the metropolitan area has to be equal 
to that in the rural area, regardless of  the distance of the residence from the 
CBD. At the equilibrium of  the model, therefore, r(x), Y -  tx, and x have 
to satisfyI4 
(3)  vO(r(x), Y -  tx,  x) =  9. 
14. If the housing rent r(t) at an x were so low that vo(r(x),  Y -  tx, x) >  B holds, every household 
would want to move to this location and the housing rent will be bid up until equation (6)  is 
restored. Were r(t) so high so as to make this inequality reversed, households would leave this 
location until equation (6)  holds. 
Merriman and Hellerstein (1993) use discrete choice techniques to estimate the parameters of 
utility function similar to equation  (1)  with the data on commuting flows in Tokyo. They find 
strong empirical evidence that commuters are sensitive to both land prices and commuting times 
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Let 
r(x) =  r*(Y -  tx, x,  ij) 
be the solution function for r(x)  in equation (3).  Since I: t, and P are constant 
in our model, this shows that the housing rent is a function solely of the com- 
muting distance x. The function r* is the demand price equation for the hous- 
ing service at distance x. This is drawn in figure 5.6(b). 
5.5.2  The Supply Price Equation for Housing Services 
given by 
We  assume that the production function of the housing service industry is 
H(x) = xL(x)"K(x)"-"'~ 
where L(x)  is the size of the land area that the housing service industry employs 
at distance x,  K(x) is the amount of  capital that the housing service industry 
employs at distance x,  and, H(x)  is the floor space of housing that the housing 
service industry produces at distance x. We assume that each firm maximizes 
profit under the given technological constraint, taking prices as given, and that 
free entry takes place in this industry, deriving the profit to zero. Then r(x), 
the price of unit output of housing, must be equal to the unit cost. Thus we 
must have 
r(x) =  c(R(x),  9, 
where c(R(x),  i) is the unit cost function, R(x)  is the land rent at distance x, and 
i is the interest rate. This is the supply price equation for the housing service 
that governs the relationship among the housing rent ~(x),  the land rent R(x), 
and the interest rate i at the distance x from the CBD. 
5.5.3  The Market Equilibrium 
equal, and we have 
(4) 
This equilibrium condition implicitly determines the land rent function. Let 
(5) 
be the solution function for R(x)  in (4). This is depicted in figure 5.6(c). 
Let us assume that the land price of a given location is the present value of 
the future stream of the land rent at that location. Then the land price function 
P(x)  is obtained by dividing (5) by i. Under our specifications of the utility and 
the production functions, P(x)  is explicitly written asI5 
The market equilibrium requires that the demand and supply prices must be 
c(R(x),  i) =  r*(Y -  tx; x,  9). 
R(x) =  R*(Y -  tx, X,  V,  i) 
15. First consider the following cost minimization problem for unit output: 
LK  Min r =  R-  + i- 
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(6)  P(x) =  B(Y -  t~)”P“(6  -  x)U/P”* 
where B is a constant containing i. Clearly, the first and the second parentheses 
on the right-hand side represent the contributions of  the monetary and non- 
monetary commuting costs, respectively, in determining the land price. This is 
the basic equation in our model determining the land price at each distance 
from the CBD. 
5.5.4  Estimation Procedure 
Equation (6) is the land price equation to be estimated. 
We cannot, however, directly estimate equation (6).  The Japanese commuter 
does not have to pay the monetary expense of  commuting, and hence t = 0 
holds in (6), yielding 
(7) 
where C =  BY’/PY.  We  will estimate the parameters C,  a@,  and 6 by running 
a regression of equation (7). 
Although this does not give us an estimate of  the parameter mix llpv that 
appears in equation (6), we can estimate it by taking advantage of the relation- 
P(x) = C(6 -  X)+, 
The solution functions for UH and KIH are 
respectively. At the free-entry, perfectly competitive equilibrium, the minimized unit cost is equal 
to the housing price. Hence we have 
Thus we get the supply price function 
r(x) =  ER(x)’, 
where 
The expenditure minimization under the given utility level  V similarly specifies the demand 
price equation as 
T(x) =  A(Y -  rx)”S(S -  x)”, 
where 
A  p(1 -  p)(I-B)ijl/S, 
Equating the demand and supply price equations and applying the fact that P(x) =  R(x)/i, we 
get equation (6).  where 
B  1  [5]”” 
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ship between the land price function and the population density function. De- 
fine the population density function M(x)  by 
Then we obtainI6 
(8) 
Since i and Yare constant, we can estimate the parameter mix llpu by running 
a regression of this equation. 
5.6  The Land Price Function: Data 
We  estimate the land price function (7) and the population density function 
(8) by using the land price and population density data along the Chuo Line, 
which is a major commuter line in the Tokyo metropolitan area. (Figure 5.10 
is a map of this line and a few stations along it.) The income variance of the 
suburban residents along different commuter lines is considered to be wider 
than that along a given line. In particular, the Chuo Line is among those that 
are recognized for the homogeneity of  income and social class along them. 
Besides, this line takes commuters directly to the Tokyo station without trans- 
femng. These are our reasons for choosing the Chuo Line as our object of 
study. 
To estimate the two equations we need the following data: residential land 
price per square meter (P),  the number of households per square meter (M), 
and the commuting time cost (t)  at various locations along the Chuo Line; the 
average income (Y);  and the interest rate (i). 
For the land price and the time distance, the government benchmark land 
prices (Koji Chika) of  1985 are employed. The data contain the land price, the 
name of the nearest train station, and the distance from the nearest train station 
for each sample. We  employ only the residential household samples along the 
Chuo Line, but exclude those samples whose nearby stations are closer than 
Nakano station to the CBD. We  deem that the land prices of  the residential 
area to the east of  Nakano station strongly reflect the commercial value of 
the land. 
16. Since the production function of  the housing service industry is Cobb-Douglas, the share of 
the land rent R(x)L(x)  in the total revenue r(x)H(x) of this industry is u. Thus we have R(x)L(x)  = 
vr(x)H(x).  This and the definition of M(x)  yield 
When r = 0, on the other hand, the Cobb-Douglas utility function yields r(x)h(x) = BY  Thus we 
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TOKYO PREFECTURE 
The  Tarna  District 
Fig. 5.10  Tokyo prefecture and the Chuo Line 
Nutes: The ward district consists of twenty-three wards, as shown in figure 5.4. The Tama 
district consists of counties and cities, some of which are listed in tables 5.5 and 5.6. Figure 5.2 
locates Tokyo prefecture within the Tokyo metropolitan area. 
Among these data we choose all that are located within 1.5 kilometers, that 
is, walking distance, of the nearest station. It would be difficult to estimate the 
commuting time between the train station and the residential location for those 
who live farther away from the train station for a number of reasons. First, they 
may  use a variety of  traffic modes. Second, even if  we  assume that most of 
them use buses, the bus route may be roundabout and the actual time cost of 
riding the bus may not be proportional to the geographical distance found in 
the data. Third, the different frequency of the bus service would greatly affect 
the actual time cost. Fourth, many passengers may take trains at stations that 
are not geographically closest to their residences. On the other hand, the house- 
holds living relatively near the station mostly walk or ride a bicycle, and in 
case they use the bus, the time cost is likely to be monotonically related to the 
geographical distance from the nearby station. 
Seventy-seven samples in the data satisfy the above qualifications. The unit 
of  measurement of  the land price in the present study is  10,000 yen  per 
square meter. 
The commuting consists of  the trip from the residential location to the 
nearby station and the train ride from the nearby station to the CBD. We  esti- 
mate the former from the data of  the geographical distance between the resi- 
dential location and the station. The latter is estimated from the data on the 
trip time by the rapid train (kuisoku) and by the special rapid train (tokubetsu 
kuisoku). The unit of measurement of the time distance from the CBD is mi- 
nutes required for one-way commuting per day. Table 5.14 lists the one-way 
commuting time to Tokyo station from each station of the Chuo Line west of 120  Tatsuo Hatta and Tom Ohkawara 
Table 5.14  Time Distance from Tokyo  Station 
One-way Commuting Time 
Station" 
Special 















































































































Source:  Japan Travel Bureau 1985. 
"Asterisks indicate the stations where special rapid trains stop. 
"The constructed time distance. 
Shinjuku. Figure 5.1  1 shows the relationship between the time distance, which 
is estimated by the procedure discussed later, and the land price." 
The benchmark land price data do not include population density in the loca- 
tion of each sample. We  use the census data of 1985 instead. First, for each of 
our samples, we compute the population density (N) in the basic cell district 
of the survey in which the sample is located. (Each cell is five hundred meters 
square.) Second, assuming that each household has one commuter to the CBD, 
we estimate the density of the commuters denoted M by M =  Nl2.52, where 
2.52 represents the average number of household members in Tokyo metropoli- 
tan prefecture, based on the Basic Survey of  the Residents of  1985. 
For the sake of consistency, we use the same time period in measuring com- 
17. Each selected station in figure 5.11 shows the one-way commuting time distance to the 
Tokyo station. On the other hand, each sample in the figure is located at the time distance that 
includes the commuting time from home to the nearby station as well as the time from the nearby 
station to the Tokyo station. Thus samples for which the nearby station is Mitaka are shown in the 
figure midway between Mitaka and Tachikawa, for example. 121  Housing and the Journey to Work in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
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muting time, interest rate, income, and commuting expense. Since we  have 
used one-half day for the strategic variable of  commuting time, we also use 
one-half day for measuring the other two variables. It is assumed that commut- 
ers work twenty-two days a month. To convert monthly figures of income and 
interest into a half-day basis, we therefore divide them by forty-four. 
We  assume that the personal income of all of the residents in the metropoli- 
tan area is constant regardless of the distance from the CBD. Our estimate of 
income of the representative resident is based on the figure of 4,932 thousand 
yen, which is the average annual earnings of an employee in the Tokyo metro- 
politan prefecture in 1985, as reported in Japanese Economic Planning Agency 
(1988). Assuming that there is only one employee (i.e., commuter) in each 
household, monthly income per household is 493.2/12 = 41.1 (10,000 yen 
per  one-half  day).  Half-day  income  per  household  is  y  = 41.1/44  = 
0.93409. 
As for the data of interest rates, we employed the national average loan inter- 
est rate of banks converted to one-half day as reported by  the Japanese Eco- 
nomic Planning Agency (1989), which is 0.012 percent. 
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5.7  Land Price Function: Estimation 
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5.7.1  Estimation of Equation (7) 
of our estimation of  equation (7): 
Before explaining the estimation procedure, let us first state the final form 
(9)  p =  e-9.7091+D (174.89 -  X)2.6750* 
where D is the dummy variable for the samples near Nakano and Kichijoji 
stations (see fig. 5.10). The variable D takes the value of 0.23309 for the sam- 
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ples near Nakano station, 0.1458 for those near Kichijoji station, and zero for 
all other samples. It reflects the fact that the residential land prices of Nakano 
and Kichijoji are shifted upward because of their proximity to the commercial 
districts. Figure 5.11 gives a scatter diagram of (X, HeD)  combinations, which 
means that the samples of  Nakano and Kichijoji are adjusted by  the dummy 
variables. This figure also depicts the graph of equation (9) with D =  0. 
The time distance variable X  is the sum of the trip time from home to the 
station and the trip time on the train, and it is defined by 
(10)  X =  5.2911L + (X, + 0.593320, -  2.0969S), 
where L is the geographical distance between the residential location of  the 
sample and the nearby station; X, is the time period of a one-way ride by rapid 
train between Tokyo and the nearby station of the sample; X, is the time period 
of a one-way ride by special rapid train between Tokyo and the nearby station 
of the sample; D, = X, -  X, if  the special rapid train stops at the nearby 
station of the sample, and zero otherwise (the special rapid train stops at Mi- 
taka, Tachikawa, and all the stations to the west of Tachikawa); and S is the 
dummy that takes the value of one for the samples near Mitaka or Koganei and 
zero otherwise. 
The coefficient of L indicates that it takes an average commuter 5.2911 
minutes per kilometer (approximately 11 kilometers per hour) to make a trip 
between residence and station. This implies that many of the residents living 
within 1.5 kilometers of a station use either bicycles or buses. 
The terms in the parenthesis of equation (10) represent time spent on the 
train. If the special rapid trains do not stop at the nearest station for the given 
sample, and if  the station is not Nakano or Mitaka, both D, and S take the 
value of zero, and hence the time cost of the train ride is equal to the time 
required by the rapid train. 
If special rapid trains stop at the nearby station of a given sample, and if the 
station is not Nakano or Mitaka, the terms inside the parentheses become 
X, + 0.59332 D, = 0.40668 X, + 0.59332 X,. 
This implies that the resident living near a station where special rapid trains 
stop takes these trains about 60 percent of the time and rapid trains 40 percent 
of the time. 
An  additional number of  trains run between Koganei and Tokyo stations, 
and even more trains run between Mitaka and Tokyo stations. This means that 
the passengers from Koganei or Mitaka for Tokyo can take the unoccupied 
trains that originate at these stations, and the passengers have a better chance 
of getting seats rather than standing during the train ride. The coefficient of S 
indicates that this privilege is worth the extra 2.1 minutes of the train ride, or 
4.2 minutes per day. 
Finally, note that equation (9) indicates that 6 = 175 (minutes per one-half 
day). the value of 6, therefore, is approximately six hours per day, a quite rea- 
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Equation (9) is based on the following estimation based on the maximum 
likelihood method: 
log P = -9.7091  + 0.23310,  + 0.14520, 
(-0.8822)  (3.3644)  (2.7875) 
+ 2.6750 10g[174.89 -  (5.29111, + (X, + 0.593320, -  2.0969S)}], 
(1.4189)  (1.9689) (3.2247)  (4.1913)  (-2.6358) 
R2 =  0.923748, 
where the numbers in the parentheses are t values. 
5.7.2  Estimation of Equation (6) 
Let us now derive equation (6). For this purpose, we need to estimate llpu 
by estimating the population density function, as we argued earlier. The OLS 
estimate of (8) is 
i 
M = 5.58861 * r.  R2 = 0.686902. 
(36.3666) 
Thus we obtain 
--  -  5.5886. 
PV 
Finally, we  have  to estimate t  in equation (6). We  assume that for our 
samples households have to pay  monetary travel expense only for the train. 
Thus we run a regression of the half-day-equivalent of the cost of a one-month 
train pass (Z, unit 10,000  yen) against commuting time required for a one-way 
trip to Tokyo station. 
F = 0.00065824  X  R2 = 0.951762 
(1  1  8.20) 
Thus our estimate oft  is 0.00065824. 
From this, (6), (9), and (1  l), we obtain the following: 
(12) P = ~~.~~~~+~(0.93409  -  0.00065824X)5.5886(174.89  -  X)2.6750. 
The power of  e is chosen so that the right-hand sides of equations (9) and 
(12) give the same land price when X = 0. Equation (12) gives the land price 
at the hypothetical residential location with a zero distance to the station that 
is X minutes away from the Tokyo station. 
5.7.3 
The thick line in figure 5.12 depicts the graph of equation (12) for the case 
where D =  0. This shows the land price function after commuters are made to 
pay the train fare equal to the commuter pass in 1985. The dotted line of figure 
5.11 is duplicated in figure 5.12. The difference between the two curves shows 
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Fig. 5.12  The effect of fare reimbursement upon land prices 
the effect of the reimbursement of the commuting fare on the structure of the 
land price in the Tokyo metropolitan area. For example, figure 5.12 indicates 
that the land price that was realized at Toyoda, which is fifty-four minutes away 
from Tokyo in  1985, would have been realized in Nishikokubunji, which is 
forty-seven minutes away from Tokyo. 
It should be noted at this point that the effect of  stopping reimbursements 
represented by figure 5.12 is a long-run effect that would be realized after the 
emigration process from the urban area had been completed. Immediately after 
the reform, the utility level of the suburban residents living near the border 
would be reduced. People living closer to the city center, who have lower com- 
muting costs, would suffer a milder loss in utility. It is perhaps unrealistic to 
assume that many suburban residents can change jobs and emigrate to the rural 
area within several years after the reform. But it is likely that many  of  them 
would migrate to a location closer to the city center, keeping their jobs at the 
CBD. This would increase the land price curve near the CBD more than figure 
5.12 indicates until the urban utility became equal regardless of location. This 
would discourage young people looking for jobs for the first time from work- 
ing in the Tokyo metropolitan area. The population size of  the metropolitan 
area would be reduced, and the urban land price curve would come down in 
the long run until the land price curve as indicated by the thick line of figure 
5.12 is restored. In this sense, figure 5.12 represents the long-run impact of 
stopping of reimbursement. 
As pointed out earlier, firms in Tokyo reimburse the commuting expenses of 
their employees because of  the preferential treatment of the commuting ex- 
penses in personal income taxes. We can interpret the thick curve in figure 5.12 
to represent the land price curve after the preferential tax treatment is elimi- 
nated. 
Let us now decompose the effect of the elimination of the deductibility of 
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continue to reimburse commuting expenses, and that only at the second stage 
do the firms stop reimbursement. At the first stage, a Tokyo resident has to pay 
income tax for the reimbursement, which becomes his only monetary commut- 
ing expense. In this first stage, the land price curve will become steeper than 
the dotted curve in figure 5.12, but its change will be smaller than the change 
indicated by the thick line. 
This, however, is not the end of the story for the first stage. Since the govern- 
ment subsidy for commuting is now eliminated, the population size of  the 
Tokyo area will shrink. Proposition 2 indicates that this will reduce the CBD 
productivity. Thus the land price curve in the first stage has to start at a point 
lower than the y-axis intercept of the dotted curve in figure 5.12. 
At  the second stage, firms stop reimbursements. A firm adds the average 
of what it formerly paid as the reimbursement to the regular wage rate. This 
incremental payment, which is lump sum regardless of the residential locations 
of the workers, will raise the y-axis intercept of the land price curve. 
Thus the first- and the second-stage effects work in opposite directions on 
the y-axis intercept, and the net effect is uncertain. Our thick curve in figure 
5.12, starting at the same point as the dotted curve, may be taken as an approxi- 
mation to this net effect. 
5.8  Policy Implications 
There are varied opinions as to whether the expansion of the population size 
of  the Tokyo metropolitan area should be encouraged or discouraged. Kaku- 
mot0 (1986), for example, reasons that investment in infrastructure in the busi- 
ness districts of Tokyo should be discouraged, because the commuting capacity 
has reached its limit. Hatta (1983), on the other hand, argues that, once the 
commuter industry is deregulated, the fare structure and the capital equipment 
size in the commuter industry will become optimal. He claims that given such 
deregulation, the government should encourage the expansion of employment 
in Tokyo so that the economy can take full advantage of agglomeration econ- 
omies. 
In this section, we examine the policy implications of our theoretical and 
empirical observations in earlier sections. In the process, we discuss the issues 
of whether the population of Tokyo has exceeded its efficient size and whether 
capital stocks in transportation and in the CBD infrastructure are at their effi- 
cient levels. 
5.8.1  Efficiency Measure 
We  first need to establish a measure of efficiency. For this purpose, let us 
examine the welfare impact of a productivity improvement in the CBD in the 
model of  section 5.3. By  assumption, producers are competitive, and hence 
earn zero (economic) profit both before and after the productivity change. Also 
by  assumption, people are mobile, and hence if there is any improvement in 126  Tatsuo Hatta and Toru Ohkawara 
the urban living  standard, rural residents will migrate into the city until the 
land price curve is shifted up by such an amount that the living standard at any 
location of the city becomes equal to the rural level. In the end, the owners of 
land-the  immobile factor-reap  all the benefit of the technological change. 
Proposition 3. If  productivity  improvement takes place at the CBD, all of its 
fruits fall on the landowners.  No one else makes economic gains: producers 
continue to get zero profits, and the living standard of  the urban resident re- 
mains exactly the same as that of the rural resident. 
In the model of section 5.3, therefore, the efficiency impact of technological 
improvement is measured by the increase in the total land value. 
5.8.2  Urban Land Tax 
The fruit of technological progress that goes to the landowners can be re- 
couped and be shared by others if  the land tax is imposed on the difference 
between the value of such urban land and the value of rural land the same size. 
The urban  land tax is an efficient tax. It will reduce the urban land price 
curve, but the sum of the urban land price and the present value of the future 
land tax obligations remain the same as the pretax land price at any location. 
This tax therefore will not affect the population density curve or the city size. 
Often an urban land tax has been proposed in Japan on efficiency grounds, 
since it is considered to discourage the idle use of land. But this tax is neutral 
on efficiency. Its virtue lies in its redistribution capacity. 
5.8.3  Government Subsidies for Commuting 
The government subsidies on commuting expenses reduce efficiency. To see 
this, take a worker who commutes to the CBD from the city border. For him the 
rural wage rate is equal to his net urban wage rate. His net social productivity in 
the city is equal to his net urban wage rate minus government  subsidies for 
commuting, while his social productivity in the rural economy is equal to the 
rural wage rate. Thus his net productivity is higher in the rural area than in the 
city by  the amount of government subsidies. Social efficiency would require 
him to work in the rural economy. This indicates that the preferential tax treat- 
ment on commuting expenses creates inefficiency. 
5.8.4  Efficient Fare Structure 
Tokyo’s commuter trains are notorious for their rush hour congestion. In- 
deed, the congestion rate during the rush hours in the national railroad in the 
Tokyo metropolitan area was estimated to be 244 percent, where the National 
Land Agency (1987) defines the congestion rate of  100 percent as a situation 
where “passengers can either be seated or hold onto poles or hanging rings 
comfortably.” ’* 
18. When the rate is 200 percent, “passengers feel considerable pressure from each other but 
can manage to read weekly magazines.” When the degree is 250 percent, “passengers  cannot move 127  Housing and the Journey to Work  in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
Whether or not this is an excessive level of congestion for Tokyo, however, 
requires scrutiny. For this purpose, examining the fare structure is useful. Hatta 
(1983) has shown that in a large metropolitan area where many commuter rail- 
road companies compete for customers, free market fare setting and no limita- 
tions on investment would automatically internalize congestion, resulting in 
efficient marginal cost pricing and efficient investment. 
Thus the current free-ride system in Tokyo inefficiently encourages the de- 
mand for transit rides, causing an excessive degree of congestion during the 
rush hour and for a long-distance ride. Requiring the commuters to pay  the 
current commuter-pass fares would reduce congestion and improve efficiency. 
In deriving the thick line in figure 5.12, we assumed that after the tax reform 
the commuters have to pay the train pass fares of  1985. 
These  commuter-pass  fares,  however,  are  much  lower  than  profit- 
maximizing ones, and hence are below the  socially efficient levels. This is 
because the following regulations force Japanese railroad companies to set 
pass fares artificially low: (1) A discount of approximately 50 percent is given 
on the commuter pass, making the peak-load fare 50 percent less than the off- 
peak fare. (2) Fares are set on a per-kilometer basis regardless of the degree of 
congestion. (3) Full cost pricing is required. 
If  correct peak-load prices were imposed on passengers, therefore, the fares 
during the rush hour would have to rise substantially beyond the monthly pass 
rates assumed in our study. Note that the inefficiently low fares not only cause 
excessive congestion in the short run, but also stymie incentives for the com- 
muter rail firms to invest in improving the service in the long run. 
If these regulations as well as the tax deductibility of commuting expenses 
were eliminated, the land price curve in  figure 5.12 would become substan- 
tially steeper than the thick line. Besides, through the effect indicated by prop- 
osition 2, the y-axis intercept would come down. It is possible that the Tokyo 
population would be reduced. Our equation (12) can be modified for studying 
the impact of a further fare increase.19 
5.8.5  Subsidizing the CBD Production 
So far in this section we have explicitly ignored the agglomeration economy 
of the CBD production. Once this is taken into account, a free market mecha- 
hands.” When the degree reaches 300 percent, the official description states that “passengers can 
be physically endangered.” 
19. If train fares were increased to the level of the social cost of commuting, the combined 
monetary and nonmonetary commuting cost would not increase as much because of the reduced 
congestion level. In the long run, the offsetting reduction in the combined commuting cost would 
become even stronger for the following reasons: The fare increase would cause a substantial excess 
profit, since by and large Japanese commuter lines already make a profit. When profit induced the 
competitive commuter lines to expand, congestion would further decline, and the nonmonetary 
trip cost would be further reduced to offset the increase in monetary trip cost even more. Despite 
this possibility of moderation, increasing the fare to the efficient level would increase the com- 
bined commuting cost. After all, current commuters are facing the average rather than the marginal 
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nism alone does not attain efficiency; the government needs to deliberately 
encourage production in the CBD area, since the proximity of  many offices 
in a concentrated area increases productivity. Such policy measures include 
(1) elimination of  the status quo-preserving  regulations on construction and 
lease laws, (2)  subsidies on the construction of high-density buildings in the 
CBD, and (3) an increased investment in the infrastructure in the CBD, such 
as water, sewage, and local streets, so as to accommodate high-density em- 
ployment. 
5.8.6  Summary 
Efficiency requires two sets of policies. The first is the CBD development 
policies, such as revamping construction and lease laws, heavily investing in 
the infrastructure of the CBD, and subsidizing high-rise building construction. 
The second is marginal cost pricing of transportation and public utility ser- 
vices, such as  the elimination of  preferential treatment of  commuting ex- 
penses, deregulation of  fare and investment determination in the commuter 
industry, increasing the price of water, and charging a congestion tax on park- 
ing places. 
The CBD development policies would increase the employment and popula- 
tion sizes, while making the employment density curve steeper. The marginal 
cost pricing would make the employment and population sizes smaller and the 
density curves steeper. 
Thus various policies and regulations governing Tokyo have  affected both 
population and employment sizes in conflicting directions relative to the effi- 
cient sizes. It is not clear whether Tokyo has exceeded optimal size. What is 
clear is that population and employment are allocated inefficiently within the 
metropolitan area. The current policies and regulations have consistently made 
both density distributions flatter than efficiency requires. 
5.9  Conclusion 
In the present paper, we compared the population and employment struc- 
tures of the metropolitan area of Tokyo against those of New York. We  made 
three empirical observations and explained the difference in the framework of 
the Mills-Muth urban model. 
First, Tokyo is twice as large as New York with respect to both population 
and employment. The well-developed mass transit system in Tokyo is an essen- 
tial factor that supports this size. In order for a mass transit system to be eco- 
nomically viable for the suppliers and convenient for the commuters, a critical 
level of suburban population density is necessary. Only then can the train sys- 
tem and the suburban bus system supply frequent service. The fact that the 
suburbanization of  Tokyo took  place before  motorization occurred helped 
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Second, the CBD of Tokyo is underused in terms of both employment and 
residential population densities. This may  be explained by the technological 
limitations that existed until 1970 regarding constructing aseismic skyscrapers 
and by the Land Lease and Building Lease Laws. 
Third, the residential area of  Tokyo is more spread out, and its suburban 
population density curve is flatter than that of New York. This can be explained 
by the lower cost of commuting time due to the well-developed suburban tran- 
sit system. In  addition, it may  be explained by  the fact that the commuting 
expenses of the employees in Tokyo are reimbursed by their employers, which 
in turn is caused by the exclusion of commuting expenses under the personal 
income tax in Japan. Our empirical results shown in figure 5.12 demonstrate a 
substantial impact of  this preferential tax treatment of  commuting expenses 
upon the land price structure of the Tokyo metropolitan area. 
The low cost of commuting time in Tokyo resulting from the well-developed 
commuter train system, which has enabled Tokyo to attain a large population 
size and high population densities in the suburban areas, explains the high 
residential land prices in Tokyo. Besides, government subsidies through prefer- 
ential tax treatment make the land prices in the suburbs even higher. 
On the other hand, high land prices should be accompanied by high employ- 
ment densities in the business district. In the Tokyo CBD, however, relatively 
high land prices are accompanied by relatively low employment densities. This 
appears to reflect the fact that the Tokyo CBD is in the adjustment process 
toward an equilibrium with a high employment density as a result of  the re- 
moval of the technological constraint on aseismic construction. In other words, 
the market seems to have  capitalized the future high CBD productivity that 
will be attained when the potentially high density is realized in the eventual 
equilibrium. Also, a more rapid increase in the employment density at the CBD 
relative to the surrounding business districts seems to confirm that the Tokyo 
CBD is in the adjustment process. 
Finally, we examined the normative economics of Tokyo. It was shown that 
a combination of the following two policies will attain an efficient resource 
allocation in the Tokyo metropolitan area: (1) a major redevelopment in the 
infrastructure of the CBD and (2) a substantial increase in the commuter fares 
through deregulation and the elimination of the preferential tax treatment. 
These two policies will have offsetting effects on the total population size: 
the first will encourage the population inflow into the metropolitan area, while 
the second will discourage it. Thus the efficient size of the population in Tokyo 
may be greater or less than its current size. The efficient population and em- 
ployment densities achieved by the above policies will be steeper than the cur- 
rent ones. 
The two policies will also make the land price curve steeper. The first policy 
seems already expected as inevitable, and its future effects are capitalized in 
the current land prices in the CBD, but the second policy will reduce the land 
prices in the suburbs. In other words, to improve efficiency in the Tokyo metro- 130  Tatsuo Hatta and Toru Ohkawara 
politan area, a substantial  increase in the train fares is necessary, which in turn 
will depress the suburban land prices sharply. 
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